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COMMENTS
EMISSIONS TRADING: POLLUTION PANACEA
OR ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE?
I. INTRODUCTION
At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the United
States in its opposition to global warming treaties was an en-
vironmental pariah, and has subsequently failed to reduce
emissions in line with the agreed targets. Still refusing to
make politically unpopular decisions mandating emission
limits, the Clinton Administration now advocates emissions
trading2 and market based incentives to reduce pollution
globally.' This advocacy of emissions trading and market
based incentives should be evaluated in light of a recent law-
suit and an administrative complaint filed by Communities
for a Better Environment4 (CBE) and the Center for Race,
Poverty, and the Environment alleging racial discrimination
in the implementation of such emissions trading programs.
This is the first lawsuit to allege that a pollution trading pro-
gram violates civil rights. For the Clinton Administration,
1. Sharing the Greenhouse, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 1997, at 20. America
has failed abjectly to reduce its emissions in line with agreed targets. Id. See
also CHRISTOPHER FLAVIN, STATE OF THE WORLD 1997 (1997). Since Rio, the
United States has failed to ratify the Convention on Biodiversity or the Law of
the Sea, clashed with allies over action to slow climate change, and slashed
funding for many United Nations environmental programs. Id.
2. See discussion infra Part II.C.
3. See Michael Zielenziger, "Greenhouse" Compromise on the Table, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 10, 1997, at 16A. The United States proposed at
the United Nations Climate Summit in Kyoto, Japan, that it be permitted to
"trade" pollution "credits" with five other nations in order to allow Americans to
produce more greenhouse gases. Id.
4. COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, CBE ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW 1, 2 (1995). Communities for a Better Environment is a non-profit or-
ganization promoting advocacy and citizen action to prevent pollution and re-
duce environmental health hazards in urban communities. Id.
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this is a watershed issue because two of the highest priority
environmental programs championed by the administra-
tion-environmental justice5 and pollution trading6-appear
to be on a collision course.7
On July 24, 1997, CBE filed a lawsuit8 in United States
District Court9 against four major oil companies,' ° seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for violating both the Clean
Air Act" (CAA) and state regulations to implement the CAA12
by their failure to install pollution abatement equipment at
their marine tanker docks. In conjunction with the lawsuit,
CBE also filed with the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), an administrative complaint 3 against the South Coast
Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1' This complaint alleges that
SCAQMD's emissions trading program 5 exempts the oil com-
panies from compliance with the CAA and that its implemen-
tation has unjustified, disparate, adverse environmental im-
pacts on surrounding minority communities. 6
This comment focuses primarily on the administrative
complaint as a means of evaluating whether Title VI is an ef-
5. See discussion infra Part II.B.
6. See discussion infra Part II.C.
7. See Marla Cone, AIR: Civil Rights Lawsuit Challenges Cornerstone of
Anti-Smog Policy, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at Al.
8. Plaintiffs Brief, Communities for a Better Env't v. Unocal Corp. (July
24, 1997) (on file with author).
9. This was filed in Federal District Court, Central District of California.
Id.
10. The companies being sued by CBE are Unocal Corp., Western Oil Fuel,
and Ultramar. Tosco purchased the Unocal facility on March 31, 1996.
11. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
12. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142, Marine Tank
Vessel Operations (1991).
13. Complaint and Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Relief from
Environmental Justice Violations, Communities for a Better Env't v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (July 23, 1997) [hereinafter Administra-
tive Complaint] (on file with author). An administrative complaint is an ad-
ministrative procedure where a complainant files a complaint with a federal
agency, which is charged with investigating and resolving the issue. See 40
C.F.R. § 7.120 (1997).
14. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-d-1 (1994).
See infra text accompanying notes 84-89.
15. See South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610, Old Vehi-
cle Scrapping Program (1997).
16. Administrative Complaint at 1, Communities for a Better Env't v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (July 23, 1997) (on file with author).
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fective mechanism to remedy environmental discrimination
and promote environmental justice. More specifically, the
comment analyzes whether the SCAQMD's emissions trading
program violates Title VI implementing regulations 7 by cre-
ating an unjustified, disparate impact on minority communi-
ties," and consequently, whether the EPA should approve or
deny this use of the emissions trading program. The sub-
issue of whether there is, or should be, a private cause of ac-
tion under the EPA's Title VI implementing regulations is
also examined.'9 These issues are evaluated in light of the
environmental justice movement and the inherent tension
between executive and legislative enactments to remedy such
discrimination, and the competing policies of market based
incentives, such as emissions trading, to address pollution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical and Factual Basis for the Lawsuits and the
Administrative Complaint
The EPA establishes National Ambient Air Quality
Standards"° (NAAQS) for pollutants which may endanger the
public health or welfare. The primary goal of the CAA is to
achieve and maintain these standards. 1 NAAQS are a
measurement of the acceptable level of criteria pollutants" in
the air and must be translated into specific limits on the
amount of a pollutant that an individual source may emit.23
A primary objective of the CAA24 is to encourage and assist
states in the development and operation of air pollution pre-
vention and control programs. States are responsible for
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994). Implementing regulations are binding
regulations promulgated by federal agencies to affect the purposes of the legis-
lation, and in this case, the regulations are to ensure that agencies and entities
receiving federal funds do not administer their programs in a discriminatory
manner. Id. See also infra note 88.
18. See discussion infra Part II.E.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
20. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
21. See WILLIAM MURRAY TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 302 (1992).
22. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1997). Criteria pollutants are ozone, carbon monoxide,
nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter and lead. Id.
23. See TABB & MALONE, supra note 21.
24. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
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achieving these NAAQS through a state implementation
plan 25 (SIP), which must be approved by the EPA.26 Califor-
nia is comprised of several Air Quality Management Dis-
tricts, including the South County Air Quality Management
District (SCAQMD), which must comply with SIP require-
ments.27  The South Coast air basin is classified 8 as
"extreme" non-attainment for ozone, and "serious" non-
attainment for carbon monoxide. 9
In addition to criteria pollutants, the CAA also regulates
hazardous air pollutants, ° including benzene. Facilities
emitting hazardous air pollutants are categorized as either
major sources or area sources, and are regulated accord-
ingly."' Emission standards for hazardous air pollutants re-
quire the maximum degree of reduction in emissions, in-
cluding a prohibition where achievable, taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such reductions.3'
25. Id. § 7410. State Implementation Plans or SIPs must, among other re-
quirements, contain emission limits and schedules to attain the NAAQS, en-
forcement programs, methods to obtain air quality data, and permitting provi-
sions. Id.
26. Id. § 7407.
27. 40 C.F.R. § 51.50(c) (1997).
28. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 1997 AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT PLAN (1996).
29. Id. States must classify areas as attainment, non-attainment, or un-
classifiable for each criteria pollutant. Therefore, it is possible to be in attain-
ment for some pollutants and simultaneously non-attainment for others. Clean
Air Act of 1970 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A) (1994).
30. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (1994).
[These are] pollutants which ... may present, through inhalation or
other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human health effects
(including, but not limited to, substances which are known to be, or
may reasonably be anticipated to be, carcinogenic, mutagenic, tera-
togenic, neurotoxic, which cause reproductive dysfunction, or which
are acutely or chronically toxic) or adverse environmental ef-
fects ... as a result of emissions to the air.
Id. § 7412(b)(2).
31. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a) (1994).
The term "major source" means any stationary source or group of
stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under com-
mon control that emits or has the potential to emit considering con-
trols, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any hazardous air
pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any combination of hazard-
ous air pollutants.
Id. § 7412(a)(1). "The term 'area source' means any stationary source of haz-
ardous air pollutants that is not a major source." Id. § 7412(a)(2).
32. Clean Air Act of 1970 § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1994).
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SCAQMD is home to several marine terminals in the Los
Angeles basin. CBE estimates that approximately nineteen
ships per month conduct fuel exchanges at each marine ter-
minal.3 Each time a tanker conducts a fuel exchange, up to
6,000 pounds of volatile organic compounds 4 (VOCs), in-
cluding benzene, a known human carcinogen, are emitted
into the air." The use of vapor recovery equipment, similar
to that installed at other marine terminals, would eliminate
between ninety-five and ninety-nine percent of these emis-
sions. 6 This equipment is required in the San Francisco Bay
Area, Louisiana, New Jersey and Texas. 7 In order to address
the problems of toxic exposure near marine terminals, the
SCAQMD and the California Air Resources Board adopted
Rule 1142 in July, 1991, which required emission abatement
equipment to be installed on marine vessels. 8 Rule 1142 was
approved by the EPA on January 28, 1992 for inclusion in
SCAQMD's SIP. 9
SCAQMD's emissions trading program, The Old Vehicle
Scrapping Program, or Rule 1610,40 was adopted on January
33. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 5 (on file with author)
(citing UNOCAL, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT (1996)).
34. See South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142(b)(4), Ma-
rine Tank Vessel Operations (1991). Volatile organic compound (VOC) for the
purposes of Rule 1142 means any chemical compound which contains the ele-
ment carbon, except methane, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid,
metallic carbides or carbonates, ammonium carbonate, and exempt compounds.
South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142(b)(14), Marine Tank
Vessel Operations (1991).
35. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 8 (on file with author)
(citing BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, MARINE VESSEL
LOADING TERMINALS RULE STAFF REPORT (1988)). Benzene is known to cause
cancer in humans. Id. Workers exposed to 10 parts per million of benzene
have shown leukemia rates of 155 times higher than the rates of the general
population. Id.
36. See id. at 5, 8.
37. See id. at 8 n.21 (citing BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT,
MARINE VESSEL LOADING TERMINALS STAFF REPORT (1988)).
38. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142(a), Marine
Tank Vessel Operations (1991). This rule applies to "all loading, lightering,
ballasting, and housekeeping events where a marine tank vessel is filled with
an organic liquid; or where a liquid is placed into a marine tank vessel's cargo
which had previously held organic liquid." Id. Effective January 1, 1992, an
owner or operator of a marine tank vessel shall operate with emission control
equipment. Id. at (c)(1)(A).
39. 40 C.F.R. § 52 (1997).
40. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610, Old Vehicle
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8, 1993. Rule 1610 allows for the purchase and scrapping of
old vehicles in exchange for Mobile Source Emission Reduc-
tion Credits (MSERCs).41 The named oil companies have
purchased 612,162 pounds of MSERCs, and consequently are
authorized to emit an equivalent amount of VOCs per year.4 2
CBE also claims that the actual emissions from the tankers
are greater than the number of credits purchased.4" In addi-
tion, CBE claims the SCAQMD is using emission factors to
estimate oil tanker emissions that are thirty-one percent
lower than the emission factors approved by the EPA and the
California Air Resources Board (CARB)." The oil companies
charged in the lawsuit are allegedly using the MSERCs to
avoid compliance with Rule 1142, even though Rule 1610 has
not been approved by the EPA. CBE claims that because
Rule 1610 has not been approved by the EPA, a requirement
of the Clean Air Act,45 it cannot be used to avoid compliance
with Rule 1142, and that its use results in discrimination
under Title VI.
4 6
The administrative complaint47 asks the EPA to deny ap-
proval of Rule 1610, alleging that its operation causes sub-
stantial and unjustifiable, disparate, adverse impacts on the
predominantly minority community surrounding the marine
terminals in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,'4 the EPA's Title VI implementing regulations49 and
Scrapping Program (1997). The purpose of this rule is to reduce motor vehicle
volatile organic compounds (VOC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide
(CO), and particulate matter (PM) exhaust emissions by issuing mobile source
emission reduction credits in exchange for the scrapping of old, high emitting
vehicles. Id. This provides a mechanism through which stationary source
emissions can be brought into compliance. Id. The value of these credits is
based on old vehicles having at least three years useful life prior to scrapping.
Id.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77.
42. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 5, 9 (on file with
author).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35. An average of 19 ships per
month, emitting 6,000 pounds of VOCs each, amounts to a total of 1.37 million
pounds of VOCs which is greater than the 612,162 pounds purchased. See su-
pra text accompanying notes 33-35.
44. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 13 (on file with author).
45. 40 C.F.R. § 52 (1997).
46. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 9 (on file with author).
47. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 1 (on file with author).
48. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-d-1 (1994).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997).
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Executive Order 12,898.5" CBE argues that allowing these
facilities to scrap old vehicles in order to avoid reducing their
emissions as would otherwise be required by the Clean Air
Act, Rule 1610 has the effect of creating "toxic hot spots" in
communities of color that would otherwise be dispersed
throughout the region.5 Consequently, the argument holds
that communities of color bear a disproportionate share of air
pollution in violation of Title VI, the EPA's Title VI imple-
menting regulations and Executive Order 12,898.52
B. History of the Environmental Justice Movement
The environmental justice movement, a blend of civil
rights and environmentalism, is in large part a response to
the inequitable distribution of environmental burdens on mi-
nority and socio-economically disadvantaged communities.53
Rich neighborhoods are able to leverage their economic and
political clout to fend off unwanted uses, even public housing
for the poor, while residents of poor neighborhoods must put
up with all kinds of unwanted neighbors, including noxious
facilities. 4
There is a considerable body of evidence from numerous
studies supporting the claims of environmental justice advo-
cates that communities of color bear a disproportionate share
of environmental ills.55 For example, three out of every five
50. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994).
51. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 8 (on file with author).
A toxic hot spot is where pollution is clustered or concentrated in a limited,
geographically defined area
52. See id. at 1.
53. See James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental
Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
125 (1994).
54. See KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE
158 (1995) (citing Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority
Communities, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 85-86,
90-91 (1992)).
55. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987); SOUTH
COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT/CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY
FULLERTON FOUNDATION, FINAL REPORT 1 (1993).
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African-Americans and Latinos live in communities with un-
controlled toxic waste sites, and African-Americans are
heavily over-represented in the six metropolitan areas with
the greatest number of uncontrolled toxic waste sites.56 In
the Los Angeles basin, over seventy-one percent of the Afri-
can-Americans and fifty percent of the Latinos live in areas
with the most polluted air, while only thirty-four percent of
the white population does. 7 Similar patterns exist nationally
as well.58 These studies highlight the problem both nation-
ally and, as regards this case, in the Los Angeles basin.
EPA's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) states that in the Los
Angeles area, Hispanic-dominated tracts have an average of
.71 such facilities, while White-dominated tracts have an av-
erage of .21 facilities. 9
Furthermore, a 1984 report to the California Waste
Management Board stated that incinerators should not be
sited near middle and upper socioeconomic strata neighbor-
hoods because such neighborhoods possess more resources
and are better able to oppose such facilities.6" The obvious in-
ference is that the siting of polluting facilities is most likely
to succeed in low-income, disempowered communities, and
these are likely to be communities of color.
Environmental justice advocates are criticized by those
who contend that the methodology is flawed, and that market
forces, not discrimination, are what drive the siting of locally
undesirable land uses (LULUs).1 A study on the siting of
56. See Colopy, supra note 53, at 130.
57. See MANASTER, supra note 54, at 166 (citing Robert D. Bullard, Anat-
omy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 17-19
(1993)).
58. See id.
59. See Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 14-15 (on file with
author) (citing LAURETTA M. BURKE, TECHNICAL REPORT 93-96 (1993).
60. See MANASTER, supra note 54, at 167 (citing Robert D. Bullard, Anat-
omy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 17-19
(1993)).
61. See generally Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J.
1383 (1994); Vicki Been, Conceptions of Fairness in Proposals for Facility Sit-
ing, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 13 (1993) (discussing proposed solution
schemes); Jane Seigler, Environmental Justice: An Industry Perspective, 5 MD.
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 59 (1994).
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hazardous waste treatment and storage facilities (TSDF)
claimed to reach conclusions contrary to the many environ-
mental justice studies by finding that the significant correla-
tion between the presence of TSDFs and socioeconomic fac-
tors were low employment rates, employment in industrial
occupations and lower property values.62
One argument is that these facilities provide a motiva-
tion to locate nearby on the basis of a theory called "coming to
the nuisance, "" and the other is that the factors which result
in the siting of LULUs are market based and race neutral.64
In fact, the findings from the two types of studies are not in
conflict because these characteristics are common in minority
communities. Moreover, these "market forces" are often
shaped by discriminatory forces.65 Plaintiffs in environ-
mental justice cases have sought redress under both the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6
C. Emissions Trading
Emission trading schemes were developed to allow con-
tinued economic growth in urban areas without compromis-
ing air quality goals.67 The theory is that allowing polluters
flexibility in choosing how to control air pollution will reduce
overall costs of pollution abatement.66 Studies and estimates
indicate that emissions trading generally results in signifi-
cant cost savings to industry.69
62. See Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism" and Locally Undesirable
Land Uses: A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 167 (1997) (citing Douglas A. Anderton et. al., Hazardous
Waste Facilities: "Environmental Equity" Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18
EVALUATION REV. 123, 129-33 (1994)).
63. TABB & MALONE, supra note 21, at 77. The doctrine of coming to the
nuisance effectively bars equitable relief to parties who locate within close
proximity to an established business on the theory that the later arriving party
either implicitly consented to the enterprise or should have reasonably foreseen
that it would constitute a nuisance. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 302-04.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85, 194-200.
67. See Perry S. Goldschein, Going Mobile: Emissions Trading Gets a Boost
From Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POLY 225 (1995).
68. See id. at 225-26.
69. See id. at 226.
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Emissions trading programs generally allow polluters to
exchange "credits" or allowances to satisfy their pollution
control obligations most economically, and in order to qualify
an emission reduction must be surplus, ° enforceable,7 per-
manent,72 and quantifiable." Traditionally, emission reduc-
tions necessary to produce emission reduction credits (ERCs)
have been obtained from stationary sources through the use
of emission control technology.74 Mobile sources of air pollu-
tion are another significant source of ERCs representing one-
third of all man made VOCs.7"
Rule 161076 is a mobile emission reduction credit (MERC)
program which promotes the accelerated retirement or
scrapping of older vehicles which account for a disproportion-
ate amount of motor vehicle emissions.7 MERC standards,
in order to conform with EPA requirements, must meet the
71same standards as traditional emission trading programs.
The requirements to be met here are set out in the EPA's re-
quirements for economic incentive programs (EIPs).79 Unlike
a stationary source, however, there is considerable uncer-
tainty in measuring these criteria. The permanency re-
quirement, for example, requires that "the life of the reduc-
tion be reasonably established and commensurate with the
proposed use of the credit." ° Moreover, Rule 1610 is ex-
tremely complex, which makes compliance and enforcement
problematic. 81
70. See id. at 247. Surplus requires that the reductions not be currently
required by law or regulation. Id.
71. Id. at 247. Actions that produce the credits must be enforceable and
legally binding. Id.
72. See id. The life of the reduction must be reasonably established and
commensurate with the proposed use of the credit. Id.
73. See Goldschein, supra note 67, at 247. Emissions must be real and
quantified to an acceptable degree of certainty. Id.
74. Id. at 238 (citing CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, MOBILE SOURCE
EMISSION REDUCTION CREDITS 1 (1994)).
75. See TABB & MALONE, supra note 21, at 301.
76. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610, Old Vehicle
Scrapping Program (1997).
77. See Goldschein, supra note 67, at 241.
78. See id. at 247. See supra notes 70-73
79. 40 C.F.R. § 51.490-.494 (1997).
80. Goldschein, supra note 67, at 247.
81. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610, Old Vehicle
Scrapping Program (1997).
[Vol. 39
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D. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI appears to provide environmental justice plain-
tiffs with a greater opportunity to attack environmental ra-
cism than equal protection doctrine under the Constitution,82
which requires plaintiffs to show intentional discrimination.83
Title VI prohibits the federal government from financially
supporting any program operated in a racially discriminatory
manner 84 stating that "[no person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance."85
Federal agencies are required under Title VI to promul-
gate regulations to enforce the Act.86 These regulations must
specify the agency's administrative procedures for determin-
ing whether the recipient's activities result in racial dis-
crimination.87 Section 2000d-188 is designed to regulate the
"recipients" of federal financial assistance, in this case CARB
and SCAQMD, that receive federal funding to enforce state
environmental laws and fund environmental programs.88 The
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that
a decision to permit a fourth landfill in an African-American neighborhood,
where no landfills were in white neighborhoods, failed to satisfy discriminatory
intent and purpose); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Bean v.
Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(holding that statistical data as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory in-
tent in the siting of solid waste facilities is insufficient in this particular case to
prove discriminatory intent).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
85. Id. The 1964 Act has been amended to extend the nondiscrimination
principle to gender (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972), handi-
capped status (section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), and age (Title III
of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975). Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-d-1 (1994).
87. See id. § 2000d-1.
88. Id. This section provides that "[e]ach Federal department and agency
which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or
activity ... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of 2000d of
this title ... by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicabil-ity ... ." Id.
89. See Colopy, supra note 53, at 154.
Courts have described the nondiscrimination requirement as part of
the contractual cost of accepting federal funding; thus, the obligation
to enforce Title VI falls only upon those "who are in a position to ac-
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EPA implementing regulations promulgated under Title VI,
provide that "[a] recipient [of federal funds] shall not use cri-
teria or methods of administering its program which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin .... 90
Plaintiffs alleging discrimination have three options un-
der Title VI that can all be pursued concurrently: 91 (1) suing
the discriminatory recipient of federal funding; (2) suing the
funding agency;92 and (3) filing an administrative complaint
through the funding agency's administrative procedure.9"
In addition to the lawsuits against the oil companies un-
der the CAA,94 CBE has elected to proceed under option (3) by
filing an administrative complaint. Where plaintiffs have
sued either the recipients of federal funding or the federal
agency under Title VI itself, courts have implied a private
cause of action.95 Though Title VI itself only reaches inten-
tional discrimination, agency regulations designed to imple-
ment the purposes of Title VI may prohibit programs that
have a disparate impact on protected groups or individuals.9"
However, it is not entirely clear whether there is a private
cause of action under the implementing regulations.97
A complainant may also file an administrative complaint
seeking the EPA's determination that a recipient's program
cept or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or
not to 'receive' federal funds."
Id. (quoting United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S.
597, 606 (1986)).
90. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997) (emphasis added).
91. Colopy, supra note 53, at 156.
92. Options (1) and (2) are private lawsuits by aggrieved individuals. Id. at
156-71.
93. Option (3) is an administrative enforcement mechanism. Id. at 171-88.
Unlike a private lawsuit, a complainant has no role in either the investigation
or adjudication of the issue. Id. Also, the only remedies available are voluntary
compliance by the discriminating party or cessation of funding by the agency.
Id.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
95. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
96. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
97. See Chester Residents Concerned v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997),
cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3777 (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1620). In reversing
the lower court's ruling that there was no private right of action, the court
stated that Supreme Court jurisprudence is not dispositive on the issue and re-
lied largely on its own precedent to find that there is legislative intent to create
a private right of action, and that a private right of action furthers the purpose
of the enabling statute. Id.
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violates either Title VI itself or the regulations.9" CBE's ad-
ministrative complaint seeks such a determination. As
stated, the EPA prohibits recipients from discriminating on
the basis of race, color, or national origin.99 It is not com-
pletely clear, however, what factors the EPA uses to deter-
mine if a Title VI violation on the basis of disparate impact
has occurred.0 ° However, a recent interim document submit-
ted for public comment, provides guidance for the evaluation
of disparate impact when investigating Title VI administra-
tive complaints.'0" Furthermore, it is not entirely clear from
a survey of the cases how the courts determine whether there
is a disparate impact.
0 2
E. Title VI Jurisprudence
Though highly touted in academic legal scholarship as a
promising alternative to equal protection doctrine in the
struggle for environmental justice, 3 Title VI does not appear
as promising a means as hoped to remedy environmental dis-
crimination and injustice. This is because Title VI has been
held to reach no further than the Constitution and is conse-
98. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (1997).
99. See id. § 7.35(b) (1997). "A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of
administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex...." Id.
(emphasis added).
100. See Colopy, supra note 53, at 178.
101. See U.S. EPA OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR IN-
VESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS
(1998). Submitted for a period of public comment from February 5 to May 6,
1998, the document is intended to provide a framework to the Office of Civil
Rights for processing complaints filed under Title VI alleging dispa-
rate/discriminatory impact. Id. Evaluation of disparate impact requires identi-
fication of the affected population. Id. Proximity to the facility is a reasonable
indicator of where impacts are concentrated. Id. Disparate impact is to be
based on the facts and the totality of the circumstances using several tech-
niques within a framework of five steps. Id.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 139-58.
103. See generally James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing En-
vironmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1994); Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285 (1995); Donna Gareis-
Smith, Comment, Environmental Racism: The Failure of Equal Protection to
Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 57 (1994); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing
"Environmental Justice:" The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protec-
tion, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787.
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quently limited to intentional discrimination, and because
of the uncertainty as to whether there is a private cause of
action on the basis of disparate impact under agency imple-
menting regulations.''
The Supreme Court has applied Title VI in the following
instances: a public school system failing to provide Englishinstruction;' °6 a medical school's special admissions pro-
gram;10 7 entrance examinations for police officers;"°8 and re-
duction of the number of inpatient hospital days covered by
Medicaid. ' 09
The first case to find disparate impact under Title VI
was Lau v. Nichols,"' where the Supreme Court found that
non-English speaking Chinese students were deprived of
equal education benefits on the basis of disparate impact, re-
gardless of the absence of intentional discrimination."' Since
Lau, the Court has retreated considerably and has narrowed
the scope and reach of Title VI. 1' The validity of the holding
in Lau was undermined in Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke."'
In the next major Title VI case, Guardians Association v.
Civil Service Commission,"' the Supreme Court delivered a
fractured six-part opinion. However, a majority affirmed
that agency implementing regulations prohibiting discrimi-
natory effects are valid under Title VI.' This case involved a
class action suit filed by police officers who claimed that ap-
pointments made on the basis of test scores had a disparate
impact on African-American and Hispanic officers who were
104. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
105. See infra text associated with notes 153-57.
106. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
107. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
108. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
109. See Alexander, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
110. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
111. See id. at 565-70.
112. See infra text associated with notes 113-23.
113. 438 U.S. 265, 303-06 (1978). In stating that Title VI does not reach be-
yond the Equal Protection Clause, the Court implied that proof of discrimina-
tory intent is necessary to find a violation of Title VI, suggesting that the ef-
fects test of Lau no longer applies. Id.
114. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
115. Id. at 584 n.2 (White, J.); Id. at 623 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at
642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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hired later and consequently laid off first.116 The two prong
holding explained that Title VI itself reaches only intentional
discrimination, but that actions having an unjustifiable dis-
parate impact on minorities could be redressed through
agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Ti-
tle VI." 7  The Court stated that Title VI delegates to the
agencies the complex determination of what sorts of dispa-
rate impacts upon minorities may be remedied through their
regulations."' Also, compensatory relief for Title VI viola-
tions was deemed recoverable only upon a showing of inten-
tional discrimination."9
The Supreme Court's unanimous holding in Alexander v.
Choate2° re-affirmed and clarified the fragmented holding of
Guardians."' Alexander was a class action suit for declara-
tory and injunctive relief against the state of Tennessee that
challenged the state's reduction of the number of inpatient
hospital days available to Medicaid recipients. The plaintiffs
claimed this policy had a disproportionate effect on the
handicapped and was therefore in violation of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973122 and its implementing regula-
tions.'23
Another Title VI case heard by the Supreme Court but
not reaching the disparate impact issue was North Carolina
Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community
Council."4  A community group filed a complaint with the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) alleging that the
state's plan to build a highway through the community vio-
116. Id. at 582.
117. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (citing Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983)).
118. See id.
119. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, 607 (1983). Private plaintiffs are limited
to declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory relief is available if a
private plaintiff can prove intentional discrimination. Id.
120. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
121. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 (1983).
122. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
123. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985). Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 provides: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ." See id.
124. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
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lated Title VI. 12' Following an investigation, the DOT con-
curred with the plaintiffs that the planned highway consti-
tuted a prima facie case of disparate impact.12' The dispute
was settled, and the path of the highway was shifted in order
to preserve the community.
2 7
Thus, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VI itself
as a remedy for intentional discrimination, but actions which
have an unjustified disparate impact may only be redressed
through agency regulations.' Furthermore, the Court has
held that compensatory relief may be granted only for inten-
tional discrimination.'29
The federal courts have largely interpreted the Supreme
Court's rulings to enable a private plaintiff to sue either the
funding agency or the recipient on the basis of disparate im-
pact under the regulations. 3 ° The Supreme Court has not
ruled on the plaintiffs burden of proof as to disparate impact,
but federal courts have largely applied to Title VI the stan-
dards of Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 199112 changed
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 10. The substantive issues pertaining to Title VI were settled out
of court and the case went to the Supreme Court on the issue of whether plain-
tiffs were entitled to collect attorney's fees. Id. The Court held that attorney's
fees may not be awarded under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act in
an independent action which is not brought to enforce any of the civil rights
laws listed in the act but, rather, is brought to obtain attorney's fees Id.
128. Alexander, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
129. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Alex-
ander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
130. Because Title VI does not explicitly provide for a private cause of action
by victims of discrimination, the Supreme Court has had to determine, in a
number of cases, whether there was an implied private cause of action and
what the context of that implied right might be. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1-1 (1994).
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court stated that because Con-
gress patterned Title IX after Title VI, the jurisprudence of Title VI is applica-
ble to Title IX. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-98 (1979). A
survey of the U.S. Courts of Appeals reveals that most find a private cause of
action to enforce both Title VI and Title IX regulations. See generally New
York Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995); City of Chi-
cago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1995); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir.
1990), Castaneda by Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1986); Larry
P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
131. See Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285 (1995).
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Title VII (and thus implicitly Title VI) making it more diffi-
cult for a defendant to rebut a prima facie showing of dispa-
rate impact.'33 Under this standard, a defendant must dem-
onstrate that the challenged practice is a business
necessity.
34
NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,"5 a case decided in 1981
prior to Guardians and Choate, relied on Lau v. Nichols'36
and congressional legislative history in holding that dispa-
rate impact under Title VI is a sufficient basis for a suit
against a recipient.3 7 This holding has been superseded by
Guardians and Alexander, but the case is relevant vis b vis a
plaintiffs burden of proof to show disparate impact.
Most recent cases applying the holdings of Guardians
and Alexander find a private right of action under Title VI
implementing regulations on the basis of disparate impact. 139
For example, in Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670
v. Damian,'4 ° a suit was filed against funding recipients un-
der Title VI itself.. Plaintiffs in a minority neighborhood
alleged that government officials failed to consider the dis-
proportionate impact of a proposed highway on minority citi-
zens in violation of Title VI.' Federal Highway Administra-
tion regulations (FHWA) are similar to EPA regulations in
providing that discrimination may be found on the basis of
effect.43  The court said that the FHWA implementing regu-
132. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071).
133. See Fisher, supra note 127, at 321.
134. Id. at 321.
135. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that moving the hospital from the
inner city to the suburbs was necessary for financial reasons).
136. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
137. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1331 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 245-54.
139. See supra note 130.
140. 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
141. See id. at 126.
142. Id. at 113 (stating that the proposed highway would displace 60 house-
holds and 191 persons).
143. Id. at 126. Regulations promulgated by FHWA pursuant to Title VI
provide:
In determining the site or location of facilities, a recipient [of federal
funds] may not make selections with the purpose or effect of excluding
persons from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to dis-
crimination under any program to which this directive applies, on the
grounds of race, color, sex, or national origin; or with the purpose or ef-
fect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the
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lations "plainly contemplate that discriminatory effect can be
a violation, even where there is no discriminatory purpose." 44
The court interpreted Guardians to hold that a private party
could bring suit to enforce Title VI implementing regulations
embodying a disparate impact standard. "5
But Title VI only prohibits taking actions with disparate
impacts without adequate justification, and here the court
found that even though the plaintiffs made a prima facie
showing of disparate impact, the defendants met the burden
of justifying the location by articulating legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons. " ' One reason cited was that the pro-
posed location would have less impact on minorities than the
alternative locations. "7 Moreover, the defendants were able
to show that the alternative proposed by the plaintiffs would
not accomplish the objective sought.4 8  The court further
stated that if the claims were under Title VI alone, the ques-
tion would arise whether the defendants were required to
consider alternatives with less disparate impact. However,
this did not need to be determined since the regulations
promulgated by the FHWA imposed such a duty."'
Another case involving Title VI disparate impact is
Scelsa v. City University of New York."' The plaintiffs al-
leged employment discrimination against Italian-Americans,
and the court found unjustified disparate impact on the basis
of statistical data, which indicated a disparity in the number
of Italian-Americans employed at City University."' More-
over, the court held that plaintiffs must invoke, but need not
exhaust, administrative remedies prior to filing suit under
Title VI."
2
Recently, the Third Circuit in Chester Residents Con-
cerned v. Seif held there was a private cause of action under
objectives of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or this directive.
Id. (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 710.405(c)(3)).
144. Id. at 126.
145. Id.
146. Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 128.
150. Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
151. See id. at 1140.
152. Id. at 1139.
224 [Vol. 39
EMISSIONS TRADING
section 602 of Title VI. 3  The court stated that although a
close reading of the opinions in Guardians implies approval
by five justices of the existence of a private right of action
under regulations implementing section 602 of Title VI,"'
Supreme Court jurisprudence is not dispositive on the is-
sue."' In upholding the private right of action, the court re-
lied on its own precedent,' finding that there was some indi-
cation in the legislative history of an intent to create a
private cause of action that would be consistent with the leg-
islative scheme of Title VI and that a private cause of action
furthers the dual purposes of the Act by preventing discrimi-
nation and by furthering enforcement by citizen suits, given
the inability of the EPA to provide adequate enforcement."1
7
To summarize, Title VI jurisprudence has established
that while Title VI itself is limited to intentional discrimina-
tion," 8 disparate impact may be redressed through agency
regulations designed to implement Title VI.' The majority
of federal and appellate courts have held that there is a pri-
vate cause of action for disparate impact under these regula-
tions'6 ° so that plaintiffs are not limited to the administrative
complaint as a means to remedy discrimination, although the
Supreme Court has not affirmed this."'
F. Executive Order
President Clinton, on February 11, 1994, issued an Ex-
ecutive Order entitled "Federal Actions to Address Environ-
mental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations."'62 The order requires each Federal agency to
make environmental justice part of its mission by identifying
and addressing disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
153. Chester Residents Concerned v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3777 (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
154. See id. at 930.
155. Id. at 932.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 936.
158. See infra note 104.
159. See infra note 130
160. See infra note 130.
161. See text accompanying notes 154-155.
162. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994).
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activities on minority and low-income populations. 6' In a
memorandum on Environmental Justice, issued concurrently
with the Executive Order, President Clinton stated that the
order is designed to focus Federal attention on the environ-
mental and human health conditions in minority and low-
income communities with the goal of achieving environ-
mental justice.164
On July 14, 1994, the Attorney General of the United
States, Janet Reno, sent to all agencies that provide federal
financial assistance a memorandum concerning the "use of
the disparate impact standard in administrative regulations
under Title VI." She reminded agencies that their Title VI
regulations "apply not only to intentional discrimination but
also to policies and practices that have a discriminatory ef-
fect," emphasizing the Clinton Administration's intention to
vigorously enforce disparate impact provisions.'65
However, in spite of the laudable intent, lofty language,
and recognition of the goals of the environmental justice
movement, the Executive Order relies on existing law and
does not create any further rights or remedies. 6
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate"7 looked to
Guardians v. Civil Service Commission'68 and affirmed that
because Title VI itself goes no further than Equal Protection
doctrine under the Constitution, Title VI only reaches inten-
tional discrimination, and actions having an unjustifiable
163. Id.
164. See MANASTER, supra note 54.
165. See id.
166. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994).
This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the
executive branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right,
benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable
at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, its
officers, or any person. This order shall not be construed to create any
right to judicial review involving the compliance or noncompliance of
the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person with
this order.
Id. at 863.
167. 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
168. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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disparate impact on minorities can only be redressed through
agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Ti-
tle VI 9  The Alexander Court stated that Guardians dele-
gated to the agencies under Title VI the determination of
what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted
sufficiently significant social problems and were sufficiently
remediable to warrant altering the practices of the federal
recipients that had produced those problems.17 °
What is not clear, and what this comment attempts to
address, is what constitutes unjustified disparate impact,
and, as a sub-issue, whether there is a private right of action
under the agency regulations to implement Title VI.
CBE has filed an administrative complaint'71 and Title VI
jurisprudence has identified some standards for disparate
impact in the context of lawsuits. With respect to an admin-
istrative complaint, the standards used when an action is
challenged as violating the regulations are presumably those
identified in the Interim Guidance for Evaluating Title VI
Administrative Complaints.'72 Whether or not the EPA ap-
proves Rule 1610, the ruling will undoubtedly be subject to
further legal challenges, and the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Chester to resolve the issue of whether or not
there is a private cause of action under Title VI implement-
ing regulations. 7 ' Most lower federal courts have found a
private cause of action under Title VI implementing regula-
tions on the basis of disparate impact.' 4 The recent case of
Chester also finds a private cause of action, but finds it on
the basis of its own precedent, claiming that Supreme Court
jurisprudence is not dispositive.'7' A complainant filing an
169. Alexander, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (citing Guardians v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 586-89 nn.7-8 (1983)).
170. See id. at 294.
171. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13 (on file with author).
172. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994). This Executive Order, in part, directs agencies to develop strate-
gies and policies to address environmental justice concerns. See id. However,
as of this writing, there is only an interim report defining how an administra-
tive complaint alleging disparate impact is evaluated. See supra note 101.
173. Chester Residents Concerned v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3777 (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
174. See supra note 130.
175. Chester, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3777
(U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
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administrative complaint, unlike a plaintiff in a judicial pro-
ceeding, does not have a substantive role in the process.'76
Because the Supreme Court holds that disparate impacts can
only be addressed through the agency implementing regula-
tions,'77 the denial of a private cause of action would severely
curtail a plaintiffs ability to seek judicial redress for dispa-
rate impact discrimination.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Disparate Impact
1. Overview
Emissions trading under Rule 1610 has enabled the oil
companies to scrap 7400 old vehicles at a cost of approxi-
mately $600 each in exchange for releasing 590 tons of hy-
drocarbons.178 Rather than spending $5 million'79 each to in-
stall the equipment, the oil companies were able to spend
only $4.4 million in total.
For purposes of Rule 1610, MSERCs are generated when
pre-1982 model year vehicles 8 ° used within the district are
purchased and destroyed and the value of the credits is based
on the presumption that the vehicles will have at least three
remaining years of useful operation.'8 ' Rule 1610 targets the
1.9 million pre-1982 vehicles in the four-county SCAQMD. 8'
The rule requires that vehicles which are to be scrapped
must be registered to an owner in the District.8 3
Oil companies say pollution credits give them flexibility
with respect to running their operations and yet still reduce
176. See supra note 93.
177. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
178. Cone, supra note 7, at Al.
179. See Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Com-
munities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author).
180. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610(f)(1), Old Ve-
hicle Scrapping Program (1997). The rule applies to 1981 and earlier model
year passenger cars and light duty trucks. Id.
181. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610(a), Old Vehicle
Scrapping Program (1997).
182. See Goldschein, supra note 67, at 254.
183. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610(f)(4)(A)(ii),
(f)(4)(B), Old Vehicle Scrapping Program (1997).
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smog. Moreover, they claim that the program benefits all
Southern Californians because most smog and benzene comes
from old vehicles posing a health risk to 14 million people
that eclipses the risk to the communities surrounding the
terminals. However, cars bought and scrapped reduce
smog levels in the entire Los Angeles area, whereas the re-
lease of vapors from tanker fuel exchanges directly impacts
the nearby communities,' and it is this which creates the
alleged disparate impact.
CBE's administrative complaint,'86 filed pursuant to Sec-
tion 7.120187 of the EPA Title VI implementing regulations,
seeks a determination by the EPA that Rule 1610 has an
unjustified and adverse disparate impact on minority com-
munities and is therefore a violation of these regulations and
should not be approved.'88 The complaint also alleges a viola-
tion of both Title VI itself and Executive Order 12,898. '89
Whether or not there is a private right of action under Title
VI implementing regulations is an important issue for the
lawsuits filed against the oil companies, but is not an issue
with respect to the administrative complaint. 9 ° However,
allegations under Title VI itself will be limited to intentional
discrimination. '9'
The Executive Order cannot be the basis for a cause of
action.'92 It should, however, add considerable weight to the
arguments that there should be a private cause of action un-
der the agency implementing regulations and that disparate
impact be more readily found.'
93
With respect to claims under Title VI itself, CBE can
only prevail by showing intentional discrimination. 4  Both
the equal protection doctrine'95 and Title VI reach only inten-
184. See Cone, supra note7, at Al.
185. See Daniel B. Wood, Blueprint for Cleaner Skies Under Fire, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 28, 1997.
186. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13 (on file with author).
187. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (1997).
188. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 1-2, (on file with author).
189. See id. at 23-24.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 90-97.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 168-70.
192. See supra note 166.
193. See infra text accompanying notes 202-04.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
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tional discrimination,'96 requiring a plaintiff to show the
challenged action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
However, the Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development'97 has identified five
factors which a plaintiff can use to infer or circumstantially
show intentional discrimination. "8 The Court stated that
"[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face." 99
But this is a difficult test to meet when the challenged action
is facially neutral and environmental justice plaintiffs have
not satisfied their burden of proof."0
Even if CBE is unable to prevail on the issue of inten-
tional discrimination, which is likely given the seeming hos-
tility of the federal courts to find intent,201 the fact that an ar-
gument for intentional discrimination can be plausibly
made,02 lends credence to the argument that there is at least
disparate impact. In fact, the court in Scelsa makes the point
that intent will help support an action where disparate im-
pact is the standard.2 3
2. Prima Facie Case
To succeed, CBE must meet its burden of showing dispa-
rate impact. When an administrative complaint was filed in
196. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
197. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
198. Id. at 266-68. The factors the Court identified were: (1) existence of ra-
cially disparate impact; (2) historical background of the decision, especially if
this "reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes"; (3) events
leading up to the decision that reveal the decision makers' purpose; (4) any de-
partures from the normal decision making purpose; (5) legislative and adminis-
trative history of the decision. Id.
199. Id. at 266.
200. See supra note 83.
201. See supra note 83.
202. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 23 (on file with author).
The argument was made that because environmental justice studies point to a
relationship between race and toxic exposure, and because there is data show-
ing that the South Coast Air Quality Management District was knowledgeable
about the environmental justice implications of Rule 1610, intentional discrimi-
nation can be inferred. Id.
203. Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Crest,2 °4 the funding agency found disparate impact from a
proposed highway through a largely minority community.
This case arguably stands for the proposition that plaintiffs
are more likely to succeed under Title VI administrative pro-
cedures and regulations than in the courts. °5
The disparate impact test requires the plaintiff to show
"some definite, measurable impact."26 Though the holding of
NAACP. 7 cannot be relied upon as to finding a cause of ac-
tion on the basis of disparate impact under the Act itself,0 '
the facts are relevant in considering what constitutes a dis-
parate impact and whether or not it is justified. The chal-
lenged action here was the planned relocation of a medical
209facility from the inner city to an outlying suburban location.
The court was somewhat persuaded there was a disparate
impact, and assumed arguendo that plaintiffs had estab-
lished a case of prima facie disparate impact in order to con-
sider the issue of justification.210
The court in Coalition,' found disparate impact under
this "definite, measurable impact""2 standard where the pro-
posed route of a highway would displace sixty households and
one hundred and ninety-one persons. 2" Additionally, the
court in Scelsa using the same standard, found disparate im-
pact where statistical data indicated a disparity in the num-
ber of Italian-Americans employed,2 4 and stated that "[a]ll
that is required is that the statistical disparities must be suf-
ficiently substantial that they raise an inference of causa-
204. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, 479
U.S. 6 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
205. Crest, 479 U.S. 6, 9 .(1986). But cf Coalition of Concerned Citizens
Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding no dispa-
rate impact on similar facts).
206. Scelsa, 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing NAACP v. Medi-
cal Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981)); Id. (citing Coalition of Concerned
Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984)).
207. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
209. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
210. Id. at 1332.
211. Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
212. See supra text accompanying note 206.
213. Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110, 113 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
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tion. , 215
Whether or not Rule 1610 creates "some definite, meas-
urable impact" will ultimately be a question of fact that will
turn on such considerations as: the actual amount of emis-
sions emitted at the marine facilities; weather and atmos-
pheric conditions that may serve to disperse emissions and
mitigate their impact or conversely to exacerbate them;
demographic studies; whether the vehicles purchased under
the scrapping program are geographically proximate to the
marine terminals; and whether the claimed emissions from
MSERCs are real. Another relevant factor is the interim
document for evaluating Title VI complaints alleging dispa-
rate impact, which states that proximity to a polluting facil-
ity is a reasonable indicator of where impacts are concen-
trated.21  According to SCAQMD data, 590 tons of
hydrocarbons have been released into the air over the past
three years by the oil companies, including benzene, a com-
pound linked to leukemia.217 A single tanker emits up to
6,000 pounds of VOCs and approximately nineteen tankers
per month conduct fuel exchanges at each terminal.218 Con-
sequently, CBE estimates that 1.4 million pounds of toxic
carcinogenic chemicals have been emitted since 1994.219 CBE
also claims the emission factors used to calculate emissions
are too low.22° A CBE memorandum,"' as well as the brief 22
215. Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988)).
216. See supra note 101.
217. See Cone, supra note 7, at Al.
218. See supra text accompanying note 33-34.
219. See CBE, PRESS RELEASE, July 1997, at 1.
220. See supra text accompanying note 44.
221. Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Commu-
nities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). Installa-
tion of vapor recovery systems reduces the risk of tanker explosions by at least
14%; 21% of oil spills at marine terminals are caused by tanker explosions or
fires; in Los Angeles, oil tanker loading is one of the single largest uncontrolled
sources of VOCs; the Unocal (now TOSCO) terminal hosts approximately 20
ships per month creating a cancer risk to marine terminal workers of 160 per
million; the Chevron-El Segundo refinery is estimated to release over 7.8 tons
of benzene each year, creating a cancer risk to workers of 22 per million; work-
ers exposed to just 10 parts per million (ppm) of benzene have cancer rates 155
times higher than the general population; under the CAA, an airborne cancer
risk is considered significant if it exceeds one per million. Id.
222. Plaintiffs Brief, Communities for a Better Env't v. Unocal Corp. (July
24, 1997) (on file with author).
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and administrative complaint,2 cite a litany of hazards and
risks resulting from the failure to install emission control
equipment, and a study by BAAQMD concluded that vapor
recovery systems have a beneficial effect on safety." Fur-
thermore, the risk of lung cancer for men living close to re-
fineries is fifty percent higher than for those who do not. 5
Therefore, the fact that emission control equipment reduces
emissions by between ninety-five and ninety-nine percent
226
and that such equipment appears to be an industry stan-
dard, 7 suggests that without the equipment there is a defi-
nite, measurable impact.
Other factors may, however, mitigate this impact. The
SCAQMD as a whole exceeds federal air quality standards
for ozone and carbon monoxide, 28 but areas along the imme-
diate coast do not generally exceed the ozone standard,
largely because of the prevailing sea breeze that transports
polluted air inland before high ozone concentrations can be
reached.229 On the other hand, SCAQMD wind pattern data
indicates that winds from these facilities blow toward the af-
fected communities approximately fifty to sixty percent of the
time.23 ° SCAQMD, in response to the administrative com-
223. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 9 n.22 (on file with author).
"Marine terminal workers at Unocal will be exposed to a total cancer risk of
162.0 per million if Unocal's lease is renewed to allow four additional ships per
month to unload." Id. This data was based only on an increase of four ships
per month at one facility and does not include the cumulative health impacts of
all ships at the terminal, let alone all ships in all terminals in the area. Id. See
also Los Angeles County Building and Construction Trades Council and the
Steamfitters and Pipefitters Local 250, Draft Environmental Impact Report for
the Renewal of Unocal's Lease for Berths 148-151, in FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT REPORT (1996).
224. Notice of CBE's Intent to Sue Unocal for Violations of the CAA from
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Communities for a Better Environ-
ment (Apr. 25, 1997) (on file with author).
225. See David Mark, Group Alleges Oil Companies Dump in Minority Areas,
SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TIMES, July 27, 1997, at 17.
226. Administrative Complaint at 5, 8, Communities for a Better Env't v.
South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (July 23, 1997) (on file with author).
227. See infra text accompanying notes 281-82.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29
229. See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 1997 AIR
QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN § 2 (1996).
230. See Declaration of Julia May in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss at 5, Communities for a Better Env't v. Ultramar, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(No. 97-5413).
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plaint, claims that MSERC applications to avoid compliance
with Rule 1142 comprise 1,856,475 pounds of VOCs, 55,600
pounds of NOx, 9,154,860 pounds of CO, and 6,047 pounds of
PM.23' The disputed emission factors must also be addressed
and resolved.'8 ' The "coming to the nuisance" doctrine33
should not be a factor as the issue is one of disparate impact
under Title VI, rather than common law nuisance.
SCAQMD's response to the administrative complaint is
that Rule 1610 is in compliance with Title VI and EPA's Title
VI implementing regulations because there is no disparate
impact on surrounding minority communities and that the
emissions are de minimus.2"3 The argument that there is no
disparate impact is based on the fact that sixty-eight percent
of the car scrapping done under Rule 1610 is to avoid compli-
ance with a motor vehicle mitigation program whereby em-
ployers must reduce emissions by an amount equal to that
which would occur from the full implementation of an em-
ployee trip reduction plan.3 ' This suggests only that Rule
1610 does not always create a disparate impact, but does not
address whether this particular use of Rule 1610 to avoid
compliance with Rule 1142 creates such an impact. Moreo-
ver, the SCAQMD claims that the second greatest use of Rule
1610 is the Chevron bulk loading facility which accounts for
over two-thirds of the MSERCs used for Rule 1142 compli-
ance and that this facility is at least one mile off-shore and
not included in the complaint, so that the remaining emis-
231. SCAQMD Response, Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air
Quality Management Dist. (Nov. 7, 1997) (on file with author). Excluding
Chevron, the emissions are as follows: 524,313 pounds VOC, 149,400 NOx,
4,141,471 pounds CO, and 1712 pounds PM (volatile organic compounds, nitro-
gen oxides, carbon monoxide, particulate matter). Id.
232. CBE claims that SCAQMD is using emission factors 31% lower than
those approved by EPA and CARB. See supra text accompanying note 44.
SCAQMD claims that emission factors for marine loading operations are higher
than EPA factors in most cases, but they are lower for some operations, in-
cluding gasoline loading. SCAQMD Response at 3-4, Communities for a Better
Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (Nov. 7, 1997) (on file with
author).
233. See supra note 63.
234. SCAQMD Response at 7-8, Communities for a Better Env't v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (Nov. 7, 1997) (on file with author).
235. Id. at 2. Sixty-eight percent of MSERCs purchased under Rule 1610 are
to enable compliance with Rule 2202, On-Road Motor Vehicle Mitigation Op-
tions. Id.
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sions are de minimus.236 Additionally, Rule 1610 requires
that stationary sources purchase twenty percent more
MSERCs than they have emissions to offset.
2 37
For the purposes of this comment, it is impossible to de-
termine the precise impact. However, a strong argument can
be made that the use of Rule 1610 to exempt compliance with
Rule 1142 creates a definite, measurable disparate impact by'
considering the data presented herein, the Executive Order
and associated memorandum, the NEJAC Resolution, 238 and
the inference of intent.239
3. Justification
Once a plaintiff presents a prima facie case of disparate
impact, the burden shifts to the defendant who must justify
the action.40 If a showing of justification is made, the plain-
tiff must show it is pre-textual so that the ultimate burden is
always on the plaintiff to show discrimination, whether in-
tentional or effect.'As inicatd inA, , 242
As indicated in Alexander, only unjustified disparate
impacts violate Title VI implementing regulations,243 so that
if a disparate impact is found, the burden shifts to SCAQMD
to justify Rule 1610. The standard for "justified," as articu-
lated in both NAACP244 and Coalition,45 is a fairly deferential
standard, defined as a "legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
son."246 In NAACP, justification was found where the reloca-
236. Id.
237. Id. at 6.
238. National Environmental Justice Advisory Council Resolution (NEJAC)
(Dec. 12, 1996). A resolution adopted by NEJAC and prepared by the Enforce-
ment Subcommittee Regarding Mobile Source Air Pollution Trading and the
Creation of Pollution Hot Spots suggests approval of Rule 1610 would create a
dangerous national precedent. Id.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 197-203.
240. See supra text accompanying note 146.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35, 146.
242. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
243. See id. (emphasis added).
244. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
245. Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
246. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981); Coali-
tion of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 126 (S.D.
Ohio 1984).
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tion of a hospital to the suburbs was necessary. "' The court
stated that the necessity was due to financial problems, and
an aging facility which both hindered recruitment and cre-
ated a danger of losing accreditation. 248 Loss of accreditation
would have resulted in devastating financial consequences if
the hospital was unable to secure Medicaid/Medicare funding
as a result.249 The same standard applied in Coalition25" also
resulted in a finding that the disparate impact was justified
where the proposed highway route had a lesser impact on
minorities than would the alternate route under considera-
tion.28' Moreover, the alternative offered by the plaintiffs
would not accomplish the objective sought.252 Since these
cases were decided, however, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 es-
tablished the business necessity standard."3
Ostensibly, necessity, lesser impact than alternatives,
and the inability of alternatives to accomplish a necessary
objective are three criteria that can support a finding of justi-
fication. Rule 1610, when used to exempt compliance with
Rule 1142,54 does not appear to meet any of these. The
SCAQMD has set out various purposes for Rule 1610. The
purpose of Rule 1610, as stated in the rule itself, is to reduce
motor vehicle emissions.255 However, the stated purpose in a
public hearing notice to adopt the rule is to allow stationary
sources to obtain economic relief in complying with emission
reduction requirements. 256  The SCAQMD's response to the
247. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981).
248. See id. at 1325.
249. Id.
250. Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
251. See id. at 127.
252. Id. at 127-28.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
254. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142, Marine Tank
Vessel Operations (1991).
255. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610(a), Old Vehicle
Scrapping Program (1997). The purpose of this rule is to reduce motor vehicle
volatile organic compounds (VOC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide
(CO), and particulate matter (PM) exhaust emissions by issuing mobile source
emission reduction credits in exchange for the scrapping of old, high emitting
vehicles. Id.
256. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 16 n.31, Communities for a
Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (July 23, 1997) (on
file with author) (citing SCAQMD Public Hearing Notice to Adopt Proposed
District Rule 1610, Old Vehicle Scrapping Program(Dec. 28, 1992)).
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administrative complaint claims that the legitimate, non-
discriminatory purposes are to reduce emissions from higher-
emitting older vehicles, to provide a cost-effective market
based alternative method of compliance for stationary
sources, and to provide flexibility in lieu of ride-sharing re-
quirements."7 All of these purposes are facially neutral and
arguably legitimate purposes. None, however, are necessary
to the extent that they justify non-compliance with Rule
1142, because there are many other ways to reduce mobile
emissions,"' and economic relief for profitable polluting
sources is not a necessity.
29
MERC programs, including Rule 1610, are one of many
useful tools and programs in the arsenal of pollution preven-
tion and control strategies. 26° Though cost effective for indus-
try,261 the questions that must be asked are: what is the cost
to others, and is it necessary? Rule 1610, when used to avoid
compliance with Rule 1142, is neither a business necessity,
an alternative with lesser impact, nor a case where the pro-
posed alternative will not achieve the desired objective. In
fact, Rule 1142 is the alternative that achieves the desired
objective with the least impact.
If the purpose of Rule 1610 is to reduce motor vehicle
emissions, then the scrapping of old vehicles is neither neces-
sary, nor a lesser impact alternative, nor the only alternative.
The Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD)
has a program to reduce the emissions of older vehicles by
purchasing and scrapping them directly.2 This eliminates
the inefficient complexity of Rule 161063 and is, therefore, an
alternative with lesser impact. If the purpose of Rule 1610 is
to give stationary sources economic relief, it is clearly not the
257. SCAQMD Response, Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air
Quality Management Dist. (Nov. 7, 1997) (on file with author).
258. See infra note 262.
259. See infra text accompanying notes 295, 301-03.
260. See discussion supra Part I.C.
261. See supra text accompanying note 69.
262. BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, AIR CURRENTS 1 (1997).
BAAQMD runs a regional Vehicle Buyback Program where motorists receive
$500 for pre-1979 vehicles. See id. Also, vehicles that do not pass smog inspec-
tions are not eligible for the program because the aim is to remove vehicles that
would otherwise continue to be driven and vehicles that do not pass are not al-
lowed to be driven. Id.
263. See supra text accompanying note 81. See also discussion infra Part V.
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lesser impact alternative, nor is it necessary. Highly profit-
able corporations 264 should not receive the benefit of a sub-
sidy265 to comply with environmental and safety regulations
when compliance only requires the use of industry standard
technology.266
The EPA will also determine the approvability of Rule
1610 in accordance with the economic incentive program
(EIP) rules, which require that state programs be enforce-
able, non-discriminatory, and consistent with the timely at-
tainment of NAAQS.268 Furthermore, areas such as the
SCAQMD which are classified as extreme non-attainment for
ozone or serious non-attainment for carbon monoxide, 269 are
subject to more stringent requirements.2 ° Indeed, in a letter
from the EPA to CBE dated March 17, 1997,21 the EPA de-
termined that Rule 1610, as submitted in October of 1996,272
was not approvable based on the requirements of section
110273 of the CAA and associated regulations.2 74  The letter
also stated the need for the EPA to revise the EIP rules to in-
clude environmental justice provisions.
The costs to polluting sources of complying with air
quality regulations should not be used to justify the dispro-
portionate and adverse impact of air pollution on communi-
ties of color, or any community for that matter. This is espe-
cially true since the installation of vapor recovery equipment
276has become the industry norm. Vapor control systems, as
264. See infra note 294.
265. See infra text accompanying notes 301-03.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 227. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 271-82.
267. 40 C.F.R. § 51.490-.494.(1997).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
270. 40 C.F.R. § 51.492 (1997).
271. Letter from Felicia Marcus, Regional Administrator, U.S. EPA, Region
IX, to Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Communities for a Better Envi-
ronment (Mar. 13, 1.997) (on file with author).
272. The rule under current consideration is an amended version. South
Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610(a), Old Vehicle Scrapping
Program (1997).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
274. 40 C.F.R. § 51.490-.494 (1997).
275. Letter from Felicia Marcus, Regional Administrator, U.S. EPA, Region
IX, to Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Communities for a Better Envi-
ronment (Mar. 13, 1997) (on file with author).
276. See infra text associated with notes 278-83.
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required by Rule 1142,277 have been found to be a highly cost
effective method of controlling emissions, and although such
systems cost approximately $5,000,000,278 the cost per pound
of pollution reduced is actually quite low compared to other
control technologies. 9 In the Los Angeles area, seven of the
twelve oil facilities have installed such equipment, as have
all of the facilities in the San Francisco Bay.28° Moreover, the
oil facilities in Louisiana, New Jersey, and most in Texas
have installed this equipment.28' As stated in the complaint,
"in light of this clear industry standard, the desire of the oil
companies to avoid this business expense cannot be deemed a
necessity."282 This is particularly true where the companies
are extremely profitable.283
4. Summary
Because the ultimate burden of proving discrimination is
on the plaintiff, where the defendant provides a legitimate,
non-discriminatory justification for the challenged action, a
plaintiff can only prevail by showing that the proffered justi-
fication is pre-textual.284 If Rule 1610 is found to be justified,
CBE may argue that the proffered justification is political in
the sense that its purpose is to placate corporate demands to
avoid compliance with the CAA rather than to decrease emis-
sions, because the best way to reduce emissions is compliance
with Rule 1142.
Typically, an allegation of discrimination involves a bal-
ancing of benefits and burdens among the disputing parties.
There is some evidence that discrimination is more likely to
be found in the context of providing municipal services than
in the siting of noxious facilities.285 This may be due in part
277. South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142, Marine Tank
Vessel Operations (1991).
278. See supra note 179.
279. Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Commu-
nities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author).
280. Administrative Complaint, supra note 13, at 16 (on file with author).
281. Id. at 16.
282. Id.
283. See infra note 294.
284. See Colopy, supra note 53, at 162.
285. See Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker v. City of Kis-
simmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp.
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to the fact that a remedy is easier to justify. A finding of dis-
crimination in the siting of a hazardous waste facility re-
quires burdening one community to benefit another, whereas
an order to equalize municipal services poses no such bur-
dens. This situation is more analogous to the provision of
municipal services because finding unjustified disparate im-
pact would not require the redistribution of environmental
hazards, but would only require the oil companies to operate
their marine facilities in a manner which comports with the
industry standard.86
In making a determination as to disparate impact and
whether or not to approve Rule 1610, the EPA should pay
close attention to a Resolution adopted by the National Envi-
ronmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) on December
12, 1996, advising the EPA that approval of Rule 1610 would
set a dangerous national precedent for pollution trading pro-
grams that may concentrate pollution in communities of
color.2 7
B. Private Right of Action under Title VI Implementing
Regulations
The sub-issue of whether there is a private cause of ac-
tion under agency regulations to implement Title VI has been
answered affirmatively by the vast majority of district and
appellate courts."8 To hold otherwise would severely limit
the remedies available to victims of discrimination and envi-
ronmental injustice, and is contrary to the purpose of Title
V. 285  Because of the limitations of the administrative en-
forcement mechanism and the limits of administrative agen-
cies in investigating and adjudicating,"' it is imperative that
1274 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 227, 281-82.
287. See supra note 238.
288. See supra note 130.
289. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925,
936 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3777 (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-
1620). The court noted that the decisions of other courts of appeals indicate
support for the reasoning of the court. Id. See also Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). Title VI, like Title IX, has two objectives. Id.
One objective is to avoid the use of federal funds to support discriminatory
practices and the other is to provide individual citizens effective protection
against these practices. Id.
290. See supra note 93.
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both Title VI and its implementing regulations be enforced in
Federal courts by private parties.
V. PROPOSAL
A vast body of evidence substantiates the claims of envi-
ronmental justice advocates.293 A ten year grass roots envi-
ronmental justice movement finds official recognition in Ex-
ecutive Order 12,898292 which signifies the President's
commitment to further the basic civil rights goals of the
movement: to reduce the disproportionate burden of envi-
ronmental ills shouldered by communities of color. In light of
this recognition and in spite of the government's concurrent
support of emission trading programs,29 the use of Rule 1610
to exempt tankers from using emission abatement equipment
as required by Rule 1142 under the CAA should not be ap-
proved.
The EPA should not allow highly profitable companies294
to use Rule 1610 to avoid the expense of CAA compliance
where such compliance utilizes proven, commonplace tech-
nology that is a de facto industry standard.295 Moreover, Rule
1610 should not allow these companies to avoid compliance if
the consequences of non-compliance create an unjustifiable
disparate impact on communities of color in violation of the
Civil Rights Act.
Emission trading programs, including Rule 1610, have
an arguably legitimate role in the ongoing battle to combat
pollution. These programs, however, are best reserved for
temporary or emergency situations. For example, an appro-
priate use of Rule 1610 would enable polluters to buy time to
install abatement equipment or to avoid penalties for non-
compliance on a temporary or emergency basis. Rule 1610 is
used mostly by employers to avoid compliance with a motor
291. See supra note 55.
292. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994).
293. See supra note 3.
294. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, STANDARD & POOR'S STOCK REPORTS
(1997). The net income (in millions) for these companies for the years 1993-1996
are as follows: Unocal 343, 124, 260, 456 (Nov. 5, 1997); Tosco 81, 84, 77.1, 146
(Nov. 2, 1997); GATX 72.7, 91.5, 101, 103 (July 28, 1997); Ultramar 86.5, 61,
47.6, -35.9 (Aug. 7, 1997). See id.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 264, 281-82.
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vehicle mitigation program.296 Instead of implementing em-
ployee trip reduction programs, employers can scrap old cars.
Arguably poor environmental policy, at least the impacts of
this use of Rule 1610 are wide ranging and not concentrated
in any one community.
In addition to the foregoing, there are important policy
reasons to take a hard look at MSERCs in general, and Rule
1610 in particular. As environmental policy, scrapping func-
tional, usable vehicles contradicts a core tenet of environ-
mentalism: Reduce, Re-use, Recycle. Supporters of such pro-
grams would argue that the vehicles only have three years of
life left anyway so that scrapping is not wasteful, but simply
expedites the inevitable and produces cleaner air in the proc-
ess. But that misses the point. The reduction or elimination
of consumption, rather than environmentally friendly con-
sumption, is always the best environmental choice. Because
these programs are enormously complex,297 the energy and
resources expended on implementation and monitoring may
well exceed any environmental benefits, particularly when
the only effect of the program is to expedite the inevitable.
Moreover, the complexity of these programs renders them
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. This is true for regular
emissions programs, and even more so for MSERCs. Finally,
reliance on voluntary compliance by polluters is also prob-
lematic, for it is risky to depend on the goodwill of polluters
to accurately report their pollution and trades.
Current conventional wisdom holds that market based
solutions are a superior approach to many social and envi-
ronmental ills. 98 In the environmental realm, emissions
trading programs are praised as a flexible and innovative
market based alternative to bureaucratic command and con-
trol environmental regulations.299 But it is not that simple.
Programs such as Rule 1610 are not really a market based
solution, but just another subsidy to industry, which often
burden society with heavy environmental and financial
296. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
297. See supra note 81.
298. Examples of this include charitable donations to replace welfare and
other forms of financial aid; corporate rather than public funding of the arts;
and subsidies and tax incentives to private investors to build affordable housing
rather than affordable housing being directly built by the government.
299. See Goldschein, supra note 67.
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costs. 3 ° Instead of having to pay the market rate for emis-
sion control equipment, the oil companies are given the abil-
ity to opt out with a less expensive alternative. As long as it
is less expensive to purchase old cars, there is no incentive to
innovate and develop less expensive and more effective pollu-
tion control technology. Moreover, a subsidy that perpetu-
ates polluting industrial processes is hardly consistent with
the concept of market mechanisms, the banner under which
such programs parade.
Siting decisions appear to be race neutral and based on
factors such as land cost, zoning and proximity to infrastruc-
ture. It is these "market forces" that determine siting and
land use decisions according to the opponents of environ-
mental justice theories. 3 1 However, these factors are often
shaped by the same discriminatory forces. Subsidies too are
seen as race neutral, and even more than siting decisions,
they reflect disparities in economic and political power. Pat-
terns of economic development under a free enterprise sys-
tem that allow or encourage the costs of pollution to be borne
by the consumer, disproportionately affect the poor. 32 Distri-
bution of pollution under a market system of transferable
pollution rights tends to replicate existing income and prop-
erty distributions that, to the extent such distributions them-
selves are the product of racial discrimination, continue to
produce and exacerbate inequitable results.3 Rule 1610 is a
good example of this. Promulgated at the behest of multina-
tional corporations to serve their economic interests, Rule
1610 enables these companies to release noxious chemicals
and vapors near surrounding communities.
Pollution trading eliminates public participation, as
trades are conducted behind closed doors and are increas-
300. See DAVID MALIN ROODMAN, STATE OF THE WORLD 1997 (1997). A sub-
sidy is a policy that alters market risks, rewards, and costs in ways that favor
certain activities or groups and exist in a variety of forms such as tax breaks,
government selling services or resources below cost, and low interest loans. See
id.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
302. See Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a Magic Bullet?
Environmental Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Im-
peratives, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (1996).
303. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice:" The Distri-
butional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 848-49
(1993).
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ingly traded as a Wall Street commodity. Rather than public
hearings and citizen input to set and enforce emission stan-
dards, this approach arguably invites fraud and favors big
business. Furthermore, such programs do not strengthen
pollution standards and improve the environment because
the pollution trading only works if the underlying standards
are too lenient so that participation is cost effective. If the
standards are sufficiently strict, there would be nothing to
trade. Unlike technology forcing limits, trading does not cre-
ate incentives to develop innovative technology to reduce
pollution.
Assuming current emissions trading programs are the
model upon which international emissions trading programs
will be designed, the implications are sobering. If emissions
trading can be used within the United States to justify
dumping toxic and carcinogenic emissions on minority neigh-
borhoods of American citizens, international emissions trad-
ing programs will enable large scale dumping on less devel-
oped countries consisting of poor people of color with little
political clout.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without a private right of action under agency regula-
tions implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VI is not an effective remedy for victims of disparate
impact discrimination, who must prove intentional discrimi-
nation under the Act itself. In addition, a finding by the EPA
that Rule 1610 does not create a disparate impact, would fur-
ther undermine Title VI as a remedy for discrimination. To-
gether, a finding of no disparate impact and no private right
of action under the regulations, the only place where dispa-
rate impact has any meaning, suggests Title VI is indeed su-
perfluous.
When Rule 1610 is used to avoid compliance with Rule
1142, it very likely creates an unjustified, disparate impact
on minority communities in violation of regulations imple-
menting the purposes of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and
should not be approved for this purpose. Moreover, it should
not be allowed to enable a violation of the Clean Air Act.
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